Dana A. Goward, The Maritime Executive »

Analyst Bjorn Bergman discovered at least 20 locations near the Chinese coast where similar spoofing had taken place in 2019.

14 of these “spoofing circle” locations were oil terminals. The most frequent occurrences, by far were at the port of Dalian in northern China, close to the border with North Korea.

The timing of the spoofing, imposition of sanctions on purchase of Iranian oil by the United States, and observations by others of Iranian oil being received by China, suggests that some of the spoofing may be designed to help conceal these transactions.

Of the locations not associated with oil terminals, three were government offices and one was the headquarters of the Qingjian industrial group, a huge engineering and construction conglomerate. These infrequent and irregular events may be related to visits by important government officials. A C4ADS report earlier this year demonstrated Russia uses GPS spoofing extensively for government VIP protection.

Read the whole story at The Maritime Executive »